

Offensive Security Operations Center



Attack Surface Management
&
Always On Penetration Testing

WHO AM I?

PRINCIPAL AND FOUNDER AT RIVER SECURITY

CERTIFIED SANS INSTRUCTOR

SHORT SUMMARY:

I SHOW HOW CRIMINALS BREAK-IN,
AND I HELP THROW THEM BACK OUT...

GCIH	GIAC Certified Incident Handler
GPEN	GIAC Certified Penetration Tester
GSLC	GIAC Security Leadership
GIAC	Mobile Device Security Analyst
GDAT	GIAC Defending Advanced Adversaries
GCTI	GIAC Cyber Threat Intelligence
GCFA	GIAC Certified Forensic Analyst



WHY DO WE DO PENTESTING?

WHAT IS THE GOAL OF A PENETRATION TEST?

Common problems with traditional pentests...

Receiving a
Pentest

Providing a
Pentest

Procuring and Receiving a Penetration Test

As a Client

- What is the scope of the pentest?
 - You might have some idea
 - Very often clients doesn't have the full idea of their own attack surface
- Very often wants a single application pentest
 - Testing one application vs. Testing the organizations resilience against attacks
- The client doesn't know how hackers operate!
- Once a year approach

Providing a Penetration Test

As a Provider

- What is the scope?
 - How do you find out?
 - The customer is likely not to know what their attack surface is
 - How much is the customer willing to invest?
- Ideally try to avoid annoying scoping meetings
- Focus on an individual application instead of real-world scenarios
- You start your work, only to be surprised by scope creep



A group of business professionals in an office setting. A woman in a grey blazer is holding a tablet and pointing at the screen. A man in a dark suit and striped tie is standing next to her, also looking at the tablet. Another person's hand is visible in the foreground, pointing at the tablet. There are coffee cups on the table. The text "Does Attackers Care About Scope?" is overlaid in white.

Does Attackers Care About Scope?

Mapping Attack Surface First

Split the Penetration Test into two deliveries

- Client knows what has been left out of scope
- Easier for client to commit on having work done
- Easier to guarantee that the entire (or just some) of the scope has been tested
- Immediate value from having penetration testers first LOOK at you
- Customer gets an 3rd party understanding of their attack surface
- Easier on the Penetration Testers while they're doing work



Digital Attack
Surface Report



Penetration Test
Report

WHAT IS ATTACK SURFACE MANAGEMENT?

HIGH LEVEL PENTEST METHODOLOGY



ATTACK SURFACE MANAGEMENT

- DISCOVERING OPPORTUNITIES AS COMPANIES INNOVATE AND CHANGE
- CONTINUOUSLY DOING RECONNAISSANCE, SCANNING AND DISCOVERY
- IDENTIFYING DARK DATA AND SHADOW IT
- FINDING THE PATHS AND ROADS LEAST TRAVELLED TO
- KNOWING THE TARGET BETTER THAN THEY KNOW THEMSELVES
- DISCOVERING CHANGES AND OPPORTUNITIES TO ATTACK SURFACE
- WHAT ABOUT THAT DOOR WE LEFT OPEN?





Attackers often get in via the road-less travelled

- How to find the roads less travelled?
- Have the best recon
 - The best recon process
 - The best wordlists
 - Continuous and always-on
- Be inspired by bug-bounty hunters

WHAT IS ALWAYS-ON PENTESTING?

HIGH LEVEL PENTEST METHODOLOGY



ALWAYS-ON PENETRATION TESTING


- ASSESSING RISK, CONTINUOUSLY AND ALWAYS PRYING ON OPPORTUNITIES WHICH ARISE
- WEAPONIZATION OF CVE's
- HIGH FIDELITY ALERTS; ONLY ALERTING ON WHAT MATTERS
- MICRO ENGAGEMENTS INSTEAD OF WEEKLONG ENGAGEMENTS
- DEVSECOPS HAS BEEN A THING FOR A WHILE NOW
- SUCCESSFUL BUG BOUNTY HUNTERS WIN BECAUSE THEY FIND OPPORTUNITIES




With Traditional
Pentesting –
Are we playing
the same game
as attackers?





 OBSERVE change to Attack Surface

 DECIDE to develop working exploit and notify customer


OODA LOOPS

Beating Attackers At Their Own Game


 ORIENT ourselves

 Customer ACT based on recommendation


Proactive vs. Reactive



Building an Offensive Security Operations Center



Building an Offensive Security Operations Center



Domains

- Domains is typically the main focus for hunting for attack vectors
- When are new domains provisioned?
- Who registered it?
- Certificate Transparency Logs
 - Wildcard certificates
- DNS Brute Forcing
- Targeted Word Lists for finding new domains
- Malicious domains

Certificate Transparency Log

crt.sh
Identity Search
RSS
Group by Issuer

Criteria
Identity LIKE '%.vg.no'

Certificates	crt.sh ID	Logged At	Not Before	Not After	Identity	Issuer Name
	1023453909	2018-12-12	2018-12-12	2019-03-12	pay-api.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	1023452961	2018-12-12	2018-12-12	2019-03-12	pay-api.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	1006659669	2018-12-06	2018-10-26	2019-11-26	id.vg.no	C=US, O=Amazon, OU=Server CA 1B, CN=Amazon
	993417246	2018-12-03	2018-12-03	2020-01-03	id-pre.vg.no	C=US, O=Amazon, OU=Server CA 1B, CN=Amazon
	993256380	2018-12-01	2018-12-01	2019-03-01	*.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	993255638	2018-12-01	2018-12-01	2019-03-01	*.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	993247873	2018-12-01	2018-12-01	2019-03-01	*.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	993247240	2018-12-01	2018-12-01	2019-03-01	*.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	985230465	2018-11-29	2018-11-28	2019-02-26	darkweb.a55.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	985231858	2018-11-29	2018-11-28	2019-02-26	darkweb.a55.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	968838490	2018-11-22	2018-11-22	2019-02-20	*.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	968837981	2018-11-22	2018-11-22	2019-02-20	*.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	952503237	2018-11-17	2018-11-16	2019-02-14	es1.a55.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	952500105	2018-11-17	2018-11-16	2019-02-14	es1.a55.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	952508902	2018-11-17	2018-11-16	2019-02-14	phpmyadmin.a55.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	952500254	2018-11-17	2018-11-16	2019-02-14	phpmyadmin.a55.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	947076169	2018-11-15	2018-11-14	2019-02-12	front.a55.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	947075330	2018-11-15	2018-11-14	2019-02-12	front.a55.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	947074392	2018-11-15	2018-11-14	2019-02-12	es1.a55.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	938970822	2018-11-12	2018-11-11	2019-02-09	store.a55.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	938971437	2018-11-12	2018-11-11	2019-02-09	store.a55.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	938967925	2018-11-12	2018-11-11	2019-02-09	einaros.a55.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	938966886	2018-11-12	2018-11-11	2019-02-09	einaros.a55.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	938968059	2018-11-12	2018-11-11	2019-02-09	host.a55.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	938969732	2018-11-12	2018-11-11	2019-02-09	host.a55.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	930604731	2018-11-08	2018-11-08	2019-02-06	chess.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	930604731	2018-11-08	2018-11-08	2019-02-06	sjakk.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	930604802	2018-11-08	2018-11-08	2019-02-06	chess.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	930604802	2018-11-08	2018-11-08	2019-02-06	sjakk.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	929738697	2018-11-08	2018-11-08	2019-02-06	sjakk.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	929738719	2018-11-08	2018-11-08	2019-02-06	sjakk.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3
	929634844	2018-11-08	2018-11-08	2019-02-06	*.vg.no	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3

<https://transparencyreport.google.com/https/certificates>

<https://certstream.calidog.io>

<https://crt.sh>


```
chris@DESKTOP-8UENK1V:/mnt/c/Users/chris/Downloads$ zcat nodomains.gz | cut -d "|" -f 3 | cut -d "/" -f 3 | sort | uniq
| rev | cut -d "." -f 1,2 | rev | sort | uniq
rev: stdin: Invalid or incomplete multibyte or wide character
```

```
123hjemmeside.no
129.132
138wan.com
169.104
17mma.com
183.104
187.68
187.70
187.72
1890.no
1bakuganworld.ru
1kel.no
2009
230.17
230.26
235.104
24blogg.no
39.104
3tblogg.no
40.177
40.180
42.no
44.75
44.98
730.no
77.132
```

URL SHORTENERES MIGHT LEAK INFORMATION

URLTeam over at ArchiveTeam has been doing a brute force against URL Shorteners

Backup data

Next up in line of examples is backed up data. Many developers and IT-operators make temporary backups available online. While sharing these, it is evident that some of them have used URL shorteners to make life more convenient. This vulnerability classifies as a information leak.



Search term	Example data
<pre>{"wildcard": {"uri_path.keyword": "*.bak"}}</pre>	<div><div>uri_path</div><div>/[REDACTED]ca_20140924_1515.bak</div><div>/mp/[REDACTED]moon/415.bak</div><div>/blog/tag/welcome-0.bak</div><div>/zh/scanresult/file/[REDACTED]8adcd350958547e7.bak</div></div>
<pre>{"wildcard": {"uri_path.keyword": "*.sql"}}</pre>	<div><div>uri_path</div><div>/[REDACTED]ata-trade.sql</div><div>/decibel/variant/blob/master/sql/variant.sql</div><div>/dbdump.sql</div><div>/[REDACTED]rp_main.sql</div><div>/[REDACTED]usi.sql</div><div>/[REDACTED]%20tempdb.sql</div></div>

<https://www.sans.org/blog/the-secrets-in-url-shortening-services/>

Parked Domains

streamtvguide.com is parked




streamtvguide.com is registered, but the owner currently does not have an active website here. Other services, such as e-mail, may be actively used by the owner.

[Who owns the domain?](#)

domainnameshop


Domaineshop AS © 2022

Building an Offensive Security Operations Center



Network Services – TCP and UDP

- When does a port open?
- Oscillating ports
- Service detection
- 65536 ports
 - But 90% of most common TCP ports pertain only 576 ports
- New port? New attack surface!
 - Better assess, attack and protect before anyone else...
- Scan in different configurations
 - Attackers have time, we can scan over long durations



Using trackers to expand the attack surface

```
nmap --script http-tracker_tracking.nse -p 80 -T 4 zonetransfer.me digininja.org -oA tracking
```

```
Starting Nmap 6.00 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2013-03-01 13:46 GMT
```

```
Nmap scan report for zonetransfer.me (217.147.180.162)
```

```
Host is up (0.024s latency).
```

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE
```

```
80/tcp    open  http
```

```
| http-tracker_tracking:
```

```
|   Tracking code: 7503551
```

```
|_  Page title: ZoneTransfer.me - DigiNinja
```

```
Nmap scan report for digininja.org (217.147.180.164)
```

```
Host is up (0.025s latency).
```

```
rDNS record for 217.147.180.164: www.digininja.org
```

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE
```

```
80/tcp    open  http
```

```
| http-tracker_tracking:
```


```
|   Tracking code: 7503551
```

```
|_  Page title: DigiNinja
```


```
Nmap done: 2 IP addresses (2 hosts up) scanned in 0.30 seconds
```


403/404/Splash-Pages

- Building great wordlists
 - CEWL is extremely useful
- DNS enumeration
- Content enumeration
- Indexed information in search engines
- VHOST enumeration
- IIS short name scanning
 - Bug bountry tip #1!



Building an Offensive Security Operations Center



Technology Stack


- Libraries might be vulnerable
 - JavaScript, dependencies, plugins, themes and more...
- Vulnerabilities
 - A vulnerability scanner finds a new vulnerability
 - Is it exploitable?
 - Can we hack the customer now?
 - Can we weaponize the CVE?
 - Local, authenticated or configuration-based vulnerabilities
- Log4j happens
 - How do you react?

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


Cloud Operations

- You can scan from the outside AND inside of target customer cloud providers
 - TLS-Scan and other techniques help in attributing assets to customer
- Several OSINT sources
- Brute-force with targeted wordlists
- You can ask for an identity with list-* privileges
 - Scan, test and assess risk as new assets are provisioned and changed
- Anytime a customer deploy a cloud service:
 - Add it to monitoring
 - Start attacking it
 - Detect when it changes




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Code Repositories – They exist


- Many are public
 - Trufflehog
- Use search engines on GitHub, BitBucket, etc.
- GIST's for users on employees
 - Users private email addresses might be used
- Company “real names” are great for searching and identifying
 - Real name – Company name synonyms
 - E.g. River Security, rivsec, riversec
 - Can you find them attack surface when using company “real names”?

Building an Offensive Security Operations Center



Third Parties

- Monitor Third Parties breaches and notable events
- Companies typically has a lot of SaaS
 - Does breached credentials work across them?
- Supply Chains
 - Useful for our CTI and understanding the paths towards target




Building an Offensive Security Operations Center








Mobile Applications

- Typically communicates with API's
- May have secrets embedded in them
- Contains valuable information for building:
 - Wordlists
 - Intelligence
- Monitor for new versions
 - Check delta
- Monitor for new applications
 - Detect when existing application vendors provision a new application
 - When customer name is represented in a new application



Mobile Applications

MOBILE APPLICATIONS [\[edit\]](#)


- <https://theappstore.org/> 
- <https://play.google.com/store/search> 
- <https://appworld.blackberry.com/webstore/?countrycode=NO&lang=en> 
- <https://www.microsoft.com> 
- <https://android.fallible.co/> 

Building an Offensive Security Operations Center



Sensitive Information – i.e. Dark Data

- Google Dorking
- Automating querying through search engines
- Abusing CMS API's
- Discovering file uploads
- Leveraging OSINT
- Purchasing access to vendor API's
- Brute-forcing storage buckets, files, etc.




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


Hacking Social Media and Monitoring

- Would your company suffer if Social Media is compromised?
- Can personal accounts be targeted to get into company accounts?
 - Credential stuffing, phishing, smishing, vishing
 - Social Engineering
- A few SoME has shared logins
 - Often stupid passwords
 - Memorable passwords which can be guessed
- Identify SoME accounts and do sentiment monitoring
 - AI/ML helps in this aspect




Building an Offensive Security Operations Center




Users, Accounts and Emails

- Users have:
 - Emails
 - Usernames
 - Credentials
 - Position
- What is an email? What can it be targeted for?
 - Phishing?
 - What about password spraying?
 - How many logins does a company have? Might be a weak password...
 - They register accounts left and right
- When a system is compromised, credentials are leaked
 - Credential stuffing
- Every week we have multiple reports through CTI about compromised systems
 - We do our best to get a hold of the databases and credentials
- Often all we have to do is simply **log-on** and the customer is breached




Building an Offensive Security Operations Center




How can Offensive Services Leverage a Brand?

- Reverse image searching
 - Logos
 - Company specific images
- Company catch phrases and mottos
 - “Nike, just do it”
- You can automate querying for some of these things
 - It returns 1.000.000 hits, that is fine
 - But can we check and verify 1.000.001?
 - Is it easy? Is it doable?




Reverse Image Searching



The screenshot shows a web browser window with a search bar containing 'fingerprint.png' and 'river security'. The search results are displayed in a list format, showing the top five results. Each result includes a URL, a title, a description, and a thumbnail image.

- Result 1:**
URL: <https://www.facebook.com/rivsec>
Title: [River Security - Home | Facebook](#)
Description: 1200 x 1200 — **River Security**, Oslo, Norway. 208 likes · 23 talking about this. **River Security** is established and founded by renowned industry expert Chris Dale and...
- Result 2:**
URL: <https://no.linkedin.com/company/river-security>
Title: [River Security | LinkedIn](#)
Description: 200 x 200 — **River Security** | 1 805 følgere på LinkedIn. Cyber Consulting og Offensive Tjenester. Jobb med spesialister! | Upstream tankegang - Vi jobber med de rette ...
- Result 3:**
URL: <https://riversecurity.eu/author/chris>
Title: [Chris Dale - River Security](#)
Description: 1200 x 600 — **River Security** follow closely the attackers' behaviors and attack techniques. In studying attackers Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP's), our tools are ...
- Result 4:**
URL: <https://twitter.com/rivsec>
Title: [River Security \(@rivsec\) / Twitter](#)
Description: 400 x 400 — **River Security** specialises in Penetration Testing and Attack Surface Management.
- Result 5:**
URL: <https://riversecurity.eu/happy-birthday-to-river-security>
Title: [Happy Birthday to River Security](#)

Building an Offensive Security Operations Center



Active Trace


- Deception Element
- Can we embed code which triggers when a website has been cloned?
- SVG with callbacks
- JavaScript which only returns when website runs outside of original domain
- It doesn't have to be complex, but it adds to pro-activeness



How our Offensive-SOC operates

Reporting

- Do we want yet another dashboard?
- Most organizations can consume from API's today
 - I.e. a defensive SOC
- Human to human interaction is really valuable
 - It provides knowledge transfer
 - Collaboration stimulates solutions
- What we suggest and practice:
 - Report where customers can process the information
 - Make API's and data accessible
 - Adapt and innovate





Defend Forward

CIS TOP 18 – WHERE DOES ALWAYS-ON PENETESTING SUPPORT?

- CIS 1: INVENTORY AND CONTROL OF ENTERPRISE ASSETS
- CIS 2: INVENTORY AND CONTROL OF SOFTWARE ASSETS
- CIS 3: DATA PROTECTION
- CIS 4: SECURE CONFIGURATION OF ENTERPRISE ASSETS AND SOFTWARE
- CIS 5: ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT
- CIS 7: CONTINUOUS VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT
- CIS 12: NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE
- CIS 13 NETWORK MONITORING AND DEFENSE
- CIS 14: SECURITY AWARENESS AND SKILLS TRAINING
- CIS 15: SERVICE PROVIDER MANAGEMENT
- CIS 16: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY
- CIS 18: PENETRATION TESTING

NSM CORE PRINCIPALS FOR INFORMATION SECURITY

- **1. IDENTIFY AND MAP**
 - **1.1 MAP GOVERNANCE, DELIVERIES, SUPPLY CHAIN, AND SUPPORTING SYSTEMS**
 - **1.2 MAP ASSETS AND SOFTWARE**
 - 1.3 MAP USERS AND NEED FOR ACCESS AND PRIVILEGES
- **PROTECT AND MAINTAIN**
 - 2.1 MAINTAIN SECURITY IN PROCUREMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES
 - **2.2 ESTABLISH A SECURE IT INFRASTRUCTURE**
 - **2.3 ENSURE A SECURE CONFIGURATION**
 - **2.4 PROTECT THE ORGANIZATIONS NETWORKS**
 - 2.5 CONTROL THE FLOW OF DATA
 - **2.6 ENSURE CONTROL OF IDENTITIES AND ACCESSES**
 - **2.7 PROTECT DATA AT REST AND DATA IN TRANSIT**
 - **2.8 PROTECT EMAIL AND BROWSER**
 - 2.9 ESTABLISH ROUTES AND SKILL TO RECOVER DATA
- **2.10 INTEGRATE SECURITY INTO PROCESSES FOR CHANGE MANAGEMENT**
- **DETECT**
 - **3.1 DETECT AND REMOVE KNOWN VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS**
 - **3.2 ESTABLISH SECURITY MONITORING**
 - 3.3 ANALYZE DATA FROM SECURITY MONITORING
 - **3.4 PERFORM PENETRATION TESTS**
- **HANDLE AND RESTORE**
 - 4.1 PREPARE THE BUSINESS FOR HANDLING INCIDENT RESPONSE
 - 4.2 EVALUATE AND CATEGORIZE INCIDENTS
 - 4.3 CONTROL AND HANDLE INCIDENTS
 - 4.4 EVALUATE AND LEARN FROM INCIDENTS



Cyber Warfare vs. Traditional Warfare

"Know yourself, know your enemy, you will not fear the
result of a hundred battles"
Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Thank You For Your Attention!



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